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     Full Compliance with the NPT: 
Effective Verification and Nuclear Fuel Cycle*
Mitsuru KUROSA WA**
  Recent events have placed the Nuclear Non-Prolifération Treaty (NPT) and the 
nuclear non-prolifération regime under unprecedented stress, and in particular the 
miserable failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conférence because of fondamental 
confrontation of opinions and priorities caused much concern on the regime. 
  The NPT and the regime consist of three pillars as almost all participating states 
in the Review Conférence emphasized, that is, nuclear non-prolifération, nuclear 
disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This grand bargain is the base 
of the regime and the balance of obligations should be maintained. 
  In this paper, I will deal with the issue of securing full compliance with the NPT 
through effective verification and multilateral control of nuclear fuel cycle. As 
backgrounds of these issues, we can point out the rire of regional political and 
security agendas with the end of the Cold War, looming of a black market in 
nuclear technologies and items, and the increased threat of nuclear terrorism. In 
addition, the demand for nuclear energy has been and will be increasing. 
  As the most direct concern, we are afraid of the possibility of "break out" or 
withdrawal from the NPT by a non-nuclear-weapon state after getting advanced 
nuclear fuel cycle technology and stocks of enriched uranium or separated 
plutonium through assistance and cooperation i peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
through Article IV of the NPT.
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION
  With the reveal of clandestine Iraq's nuclear weapons program after the Gulf 
War in 1991, the IAEA reaffirmed the right of special inspections, early provision
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of design information and universal reporting scheme. The Agency launched a 
"program 93+2" in 1993 and the Board of Governors endorsed the Part I measures 
in 1995. In 1997, the Board of Governors approved a model additional protocol to 
the safeguards agreement hat includes expanded information and access.
Universalization of the Additional Protocol
  We must strengthen the IAEA's verification authority by making the additional 
protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreements, an integral part of the 
Agency's safeguards system in connection with the NPT. At the 2005 NPT Review 
Conférence, many states, in particular western states, urged that the additional 
protocol should be a verification standard. 
  The response of the Non-aligned States was not a direct opposition to this 
demand, but they were reluctant o discuss the issue because il may have reverse 
effect to their right to use nuclear energy peacefully and because there was no 
progress in nuclear disarmament as a stronger eason. 
  At present, 70 states out of the 184 non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT 
have additional protocols in force. 77 states with comprehensive safeguards 
agreements do not have additional protocols in force. The additional protocol is an 
independent agreement that does not legally obligate the parties to the NPT to sign 
and ratify under the Article III of the NPT. 
  It is necessary to develop the means to achieve universal application of the 
additional protocol. President Bush in his February 2004 address at Defense 
University proposed that by next year, only states that have signed the Additional 
Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs. 
Nations that are serious about fighting prolifération will approve and implement the 
Additional Protocole). 
  One way to realize this purpose is through agreement among members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to make the ratification of the additional protocol 
by importing states as a necessary condition to permit export. The issue is 
discussed at the meetings of the NSG in 2004, 2005 and 2006. However, there has 
been no agreement yet2). This is a supply side approach.
1) George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Prolifération," 
   National Defense University, Washington D. C., February 11, 2004. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
   news/release/2004/02/20040211-4.html] 
2) NSG STATEMENT, NSG Plenary Meeting, Brasilia, 1-2 June, 2006. [http://www. 
   nuclearsuppl iersgroup.org/PRES S/2006-07-Brasi l i a.pdf]
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  The other way is through the review process of the NPT. As universal 
application of the additional protocol is the issue connected with Article III of the 
NPT, it is natural to discuss the issue among all states parties to the NPT, including 
both exporting and importing states. Under the NPT review process, the goal of the 
universalization of the additional protocol should be energetically pursued. 
  The third way is that the IAEA and cooperating states should persuade each 
country to sign and ratify by using incentives or disincentives. The Agency has 
been holding seminars to explain the relevance and importance of the additional 
protocoi in order to persuade states that have not signed or ratified it.
Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Vérification
  In June 2005, the Board set up a new Advisory Committee on Safeguards and 
Verification, based on the initiative of President Bush on February 14, 2004, to 
explore how the safeguards system could be further strengthened. Areas that could 
be addressed could include more information sharing, the use of new emerging 
technologies, enhancing the Agency's independent analytical capabilities, and 
ensuring that the Agency has an adequate and uniform legal authority to conduct 
credible verification3) 
.
U. S. Proposai on Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)4)
  Under the GNEP announced in February 2006 by the U.S., an international 
safeguards program is an integral part of the global expansion of nuclear energy 
and the development of future proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies. In 
order for the IAEA to effectively and efficiently monitor and verify nuclear 
materials, GNEP will design advanced safeguards approaches directly into the 
planning and building of the expanding base of nuclear energy systems and fuel 
cycle facilities.
3) Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, "Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards: Special Committee 
   To the Rescue?" Arms Control Today, Vol.35, No.l0, December 2005, pp.17-22. 
4) U.S. Department of Energy, The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. [http://www.gnep.energy. 
   gov/]
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MULTILATERAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 
  -Restriction to or Denial of National Enrichment and Reprocessing-
Past Efforts at Multilateral Approaches
  Since the birth of nuclear age, various attempts have been pursued to prevent 
prolifération of nuclear weapons by establishing multilateral institutions or control 
as follows; 
-Baruch Plan proposed an International Atomic Development Authority in 1946. 
-Atoms for Peace speech by U.S. President Eisenhower in 1963 proposed an 
IAEA. 
-IAEA Statute of 1956 provides for Agency control over special fissionable 
material. 
-IAEA study project on regional nuclear fuel cycle centers (RNFC) was 
conducted in 1975 to 1977. 
-Committee on International Plutonium Storage (IPS) was held from 1978 to 
1982. 
-International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Programme (INFCE) was held from 1977 to 
1980. 
-United Nations Conférence for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) was held in 1987. 
-Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) was held from 1980 to 1987. 
-International Symposium on Nuclear Fuel and Reactor Strategies: Adjusting to 
New Realities was held in 1997. 
-Technical , Economic and Institutional Aspects of Regional Spend Fuel Storage 
Facilities (RSFSF) were examined in 2003.
ElBaradei 's Proposais
  At the 47'h General Conférence in September 2003, Director General Mohamed 
ElBaradei said that multilateral approaches, based on improved nuclear technology 
control, greater operational transparency, and nuclear fuel and power plant supply 
assurances, could serve to strengthen the nuclear non-prolifération regime. 
  In October 2003, the Director General in The Economist proposed to limit the 
processing of weapon-usable material in civilian nuclear programme, as well as the 
production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment, by agreeing to
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restrict those operations exclusively to facilities under multilateral control; to 
deploy nuclear-energy system that, by design, avoids the use of materials that may 
be applied directly to making nuclear weapons; and consider multinational 
approaches to the management and disposai of spent fuel and radioactive waste. 
These limitations would be accompanied by an assurance of nuclear fuel and 
service supplies. 
  Following up on his proposai, during the summer of 2004, the Director General 
set up an independent international Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA). 
  At the CarnegieInternational Non-Prolifération Conférence in November 2005, 
he proposed the following four steps to control sensitive nuclear technology.
1 
2
3.
4
Provide assurance of supply of reactor technology and nuclear fuel; 
Accept a time-limited moratorium (of perhaps 5-10 years) on new uranium 
enrichment and plutonium separation facilities. 
Establish a framework for multilateral management and control of the 'back 
end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposai); and 
Create a similar framework for multilateral management and control of the 
`front end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. enrichment and fuel production)5).
President Bush 's Proposal6)
  President George Bush, in February 2004, announced new measures to counter 
the threat of WMD and made seven proposais. As a fourth step, he proposes, "The 
world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at 
reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce 
enrichment and reprocessing. The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to 
any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and 
reprocessing plants. This step will prevent new states from developing the means 
to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to 
cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary 
for manufacturing illegal weapons.
5) Mohamed ElBaradei, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: Are We Making Progress?" 
   Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conférence, Washington, DC, 7 November 2005. [http:// 
   www.carnegieendowment. org/static/npp/2005 con ference/presentations/e Ibaladei. pdfl 
6) George W. Bush, note 1.
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U.N. Secretary-General 's Reports
  The Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges 
and Change7), of December 2004, urged negotiations without delay on an 
arrangement, under the IAEA Statute, for the Agency to serve as a guarantor of two 
fuel cycle related services: the supply of fissile material for fuel, and the 
reprocessing of spend fuel. It also urged that, while this arrangement is being 
negotiated, avoluntary time-limited moratorium on new fuel cycle facilities be put 
in place. 
  The April 2005 Report of the Secretary-General entitled In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for Allé also proposed that 
states should be guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel at market rates for peaceful 
purposes with the IAEA acting as a guarantor.
Expert Group Report to the Director General of the IAEA9)
  The report of the Expert Group, stating the objective of increasing non-
prolifération assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, while 
preserving assurances of supply and services around world, could be achieved 
through a set of gradually introduced Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs), 
suggested the following five approaches.
1. Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a case by case basis 
  through long term contracts and transparent suppliera' arrangements with 
  government backing. Examples would be fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, 
  commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, as well as commercial fuel 
  banks. 
2. Developing and implementing international supply guarantees with the IAEA
7)
s)
9)
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, UN General Assembly, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 
Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security 
and Human Rights. for All, UN General Assembly, A15912005, 21 March 2005. 
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report to the Director General 
of the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2005, (INFCIRC/640). Tariq Rauf and 
Fiona Simpson, "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Is It Time for a Multilateral Approach?" Arms Control 
Todav, Vol.34, No.1, December 2004, pp.17-21; Lawrence Scheinman, "The Nuclear Fuel: A 
Challenge for Nonproliferation," Disarniament Diplomacy, No.76, March/April 2004. [http:// 
www. acronym.org.ud/dd/dd76/761s.hlm]
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  participation. Différent models should be investigated, notably with the IAEA 
  as a guarantor of service supplies, e.g. as administrator of a fuel bank. 
3. Promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing 
  them as confidence building measures, with the participation of NPT NNWS 
  and NWS, and non-NPT States. 
4. Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in 
  particular egional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing 
  rights or co-management for front and back end nuclear facilities, such as 
  uranium enrichment, fuel reprocessing, disposai and storage of spent fuel (and 
  combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power parks would also servethis 
  objective. 
5. The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the world might 
  call for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral 
  arrangements - by region or by continent - and for broader cooperation, 
  involving the IAEA and the international community.
U.S. Initiative for a Reserve of Nuclear Fuel '01
  At the General Conférence of the IAEA in September 2005, U.S. Secretary 
Bodman announced to establish a reserve of nuclear fuel from materials previously 
declared excess to national security needs. Specifically, he announced that the U.S. 
would commit up to 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to support 
assurances of reliable nuclear fuel supplies for states that forego enrichment and 
reprocessing. 
  He proposed that supplier states and the IAEA establish a reliable mechanism to 
resolve problems should a disruption in supply arise. Materiai made available by 
the United States under the initiative would serve to back-up this proposed 
mechanism.
Russia 's Initiative for International Fuel Cycle Centers 11)
  In January 2006, President of Russia states that: We need to create the prototype 
of a global infrastructure that will give ail interested countries equal access to 
nuclear energy, while stressing reliable compliance with the requirements of the
10) INFCIRC/659, 29 September 2005. 
1 1) INFCIRC/667, 8 February 2006.
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non-prolifération regime. The creation of a system of international centers 
providing nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, on a non-
discriminatory basis and under the control of the IAEA, could become a key 
element in developing this new infrastructure. Russia has already made just such a 
proposal and is prepared to establish an international center of this kind on its 
territory.
U. S. Proposai on Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) 12)
  President Bush, in February 2006, announced the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP) that will use a nuclear fuel cycle that enhances energy security, 
while promoting non-prolifération. The U.S. will work with other advanced 
nuclear nations to develop a fuel services program that would provide nuclear fuel 
and recycling services to nations in return for their commitment to refrain from 
developing enrichment and recycling technologies. 
  Under the GNEP, a consortiumof nations with advanced nuclear technologies 
would ensure that countries who agree to forgo their own investments in 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies will have reliable access to nuclear fuel. 
Moreover, once the advanced recycling technologies are demonstrated, the spend 
fuel would be returned to fuel supplier countries for recycling and possibly ultimate 
disposition. This builds on the moratorium on the sale of enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies that has been in place over the past two years among G-8 
nations.
Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel 13)
  In June 2006, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States circulated a proposal entitled, "Concept for 
a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel". This is a backup 
(or last resort safety net) mechanism when usual commercial access of nuclear fuel
12) U.S..Department of Energy, The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. [http://www.gnep.energy. 
   gov/] 
13) Concept fora Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel, Permanent Mission of 
   France, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany, Permanent Mission of the 
   Netherlands, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, Permanent Mission of the United 
   Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S. Mission to International Organization in 
   Vienna, Vienna, 31 May 2006.
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is interrupted. It focuses on assurances for reliable supply of enrichment services or 
enriched uranium. 
  It will formally establish a standing multilateral mechanism at the IAEA. If 
commercial supply arrangements are interrupted for reasons other than non-
prolifération obligations and cannot restored through normal commercial processes, 
the mechanism could be triggered by the receiving state or the supplier state, by 
approaching the IAEA. The IAEA would determine whether the receiving state 
meets the conditions for use of the backup mechanism. 
  Supplier states and recipient states would participate actively in the 
consultations. Supplier states would welcome and facilitate arrangements for 
commercial suppliers of enriched uranium to establish a mutual back-up system. In 
addition, the mechanism could be supported by reserves of low enriched uranium. 
The U.S. has announced it will couvert up to 17 tons of HEU excess to national 
security needs to LEU and hold it as a reserve to support fuel supply assurances.
Proposais by Japan and Other States
  In September 2006, Japan submitted aproposai on IAEA Standby Arrangements 
System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply14), which is supposed to be 
complementary to the above-mentioned six-nation proposai on the Concept for a 
Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel. Japan deems it proper 
to take care of not only uranium enrichment services but also ail important 
activities of the front-end of nuclear fuel cycle, namely, uranium supply, uranium 
storage, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication as market failure might occur 
at various junctures; and to focus not only on remedial responses to market failure 
for uranium fuel supply, but also on the prevention of the occurrence of such failure 
by reporting the IAEA up-to-date information about he market, that is, each state's 
capacity in various activities related to fuel supply to nuclear power generation, so 
as to improve the transparency of the market and to alert the degradation of its 
adequacy if it is recognized. 
  In addition,the United Kingdom suggested issuing "enrichment bonds" as a 
means of guaranteeing enrichment services and Germany proposed to place 
multilateral uranium enrichment under the auspices of the IAEA and its export 
control.
14) INFCIRC/683, 15 September 2006.
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Analysis
  Since Director General's statement in 2003, multilateral approaches to nuclear 
fuel cycle have been proactively referred, and several proposais have been 
submitted and discussed. 
  As the first necessary condition, there is a general consensus on the need for an 
assurance of supply of enriched uranium and services. The key feature of such an 
arrangement is not simply availability, but reliability. For this assurance of supply 
mechanism to be credible, it must be based on apolitical, objective non-
prolifération criteria. 
  Under the IAEA Statute, the Agency is authorized to serve as the guarantor of 
two fuel cycle related services: the supply of fissile material for fuel, and 
reprocessing of spent fuel. The IAEA could act as the facilitator and guarantor of a 
virtual or actual fuel bank, as a supplier of last resort. 
  The most critical issue is whether a multilateral approach presupposes that 
beneficiaries have to abandon its own enrichment and reprocessing activities 
altogether. 
  All U.S. proposals presuppose the denial of enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities and technologies as shown in the February 2004 Bush proposai, the 
September 2005 Initiative and February 2006 GNEP proposal. 
  Bush, proposed that the NSG members shouldrefuse to sell enrichment and 
reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess 
full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. Discussions in the NSG 
for last three yeas have not produced any agreement on this point. 
  It seems to be difficult to get consensus on the condition, because it will be 
understood to be tantamount to establish a new division between those who are 
permitted to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium and those who are not. 
  Some members rather prefer "criteria-based approach", that is, if states fulfill 
certain criteria (e.g. ratification of the additional protocol, etc.), then they should be 
able to access enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 
  ElBaradei's proposai does not excludethe possibility that a state have an access 
to enrichment or reprocessing technologies under multilateral control, just like the 
URENCO. His proposai mainly prohibits operation of enrichment or reprocessing 
by one nation only and recommends doing so under multilateral control, though lie 
would like to see many states abandoning the option of enrichment and 
reprocessing.
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CONCLUSION
  Facing with the prolifération crisis mainly through possible abuse of nuclear 
energy in civilian sector, the international community, in particular the IAEA and 
advanced nuclear powers, is now working hard to prevent further prolifération of 
nuclear weapons. It is urgent for effective measures to be agreed as soon as 
possible to deal with emerging threat. 
  Measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards and to establish multilateral 
nuclear fuel cycle that are examined above are two of many measures to buttress 
the nuclear non-prolifération regime. 
  The measures that will be acceptable to almost all states should fulfill the 
condition of legality, legitimacy and effectiveness. They also take the whole 
structure of the nuclear non-prolifération regime into account, that is, the three 
pillars of the regime, not only nuclear non-prolifération, but also nuclear 
disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
